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Implementation of continuous-variable
quantum key distribution with composable
and one-sided-device-independent security
against coherent attacks
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Reinhard F. Werner4 & Roman Schnabel1,3
Secret communication over public channels is one of the central pillars of a modern
information society. Using quantum key distribution this is achieved without relying on the
hardness of mathematical problems, which might be compromised by improved algorithms or
by future quantum computers. State-of-the-art quantum key distribution requires composable
security against coherent attacks for a ﬁnite number of distributed quantum states as well as
robustness against implementation side channels. Here we present an implementation
of continuous-variable quantum key distribution satisfying these requirements. Our
implementation is based on the distribution of continuous-variable Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen
entangled light. It is one-sided device independent, which means the security of the generated
key is independent of any memoryfree attacks on the remote detector. Since continuous-
variable encoding is compatible with conventional optical communication technology, our
work is a step towards practical implementations of quantum key distribution with state-of-
the-art security based solely on telecom components.
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U
sing a quantum key distribution (QKD) system, the
communicating parties employ a cryptographic protocol
that cannot be broken, neither by todays nor by future
technology1,2. The security of the key distributed by such a
system is guaranteed on the basis of quantum theory by a
mathematical proof, which has to consider the most sophisticated
(quantum) attacks on the quantum channel, so-called ‘coherent
attacks’. Furthermore, security has to be established in a
‘composable’ fashion, which means that if the distributed key is
used in another secure protocol (like one-time-pad encryption), it
remains secure in the composition of the two protocols3,4. To
make a security proof applicable to actual implementations, it is
important to include all effects due to the ﬁnite number of
distributed quantum states. In addition, the security proof has to
model the source and the detectors correctly to prevent possible
‘side-channels’, including those which may only be discovered in
the future.
Theoretically, an elegant way to deal with imperfect sources
and detectors and therefore with side channels of the implemen-
tation, is to make a proof completely device independent5. The
found secret key rates are, however, very low so far and an
implementation requires at least a detection-loophole-free Bell
test, which has not been achieved in a QKD implementation so
far due to inefﬁcient detectors and photon loss in the quantum
channel5. The idea of removing assumptions on devices can
nevertheless be realized partially. For instance, measurement-
device-independent QKD relies only on assumptions about the
sources, located at the honest communicating parties, Alice and
Bob, but not about the detectors that can be in control of the
eavesdropper6–8. While in measurement-device-independent
QKD the devices of Alice and Bob have to be trusted to fulﬁl
the assumptions, it has recently been shown that QKD is even
possible when the device of one of the honest parties is
untrusted9–11. For discrete variables the security of this one-
sided device-independent (1sDI) scheme has been analysed under
the assumption on the untrusted device to be memoryless, and
similar secret key rates have been obtained as in QKD
implementations with trusted devices only9,10,12. Using
continuous variables (CVs) 1sDI QKD has been recently
proven secure for collective attacks and inﬁnitely many
quantum state distributions13 as well as with ﬁnite-size,
composable security against coherent attacks under the same
assumption of a memoryless untrusted device14.
So far experimental continuous-variable implementations were
only guaranteed to be secure against so-called ‘collective
attacks’15–18. While this class of attacks already allows an
eavesdropper to possess a quantum memory, all quantum states
are attacked identically using a collective Gaussian operation.
Although Gaussian collective attacks are in the limit of an inﬁnite
number of distributed quantum states as strong as coherent
attacks, it is currently not known whether this holds for a realistic
ﬁnite key length protocol. For collective attacks a transmission
distance of 80 km was achieved with a ﬁnite number of
distributed quantum states using Gaussian modulated coherent
states18,19. Previous proofs did also ﬁnd composable security
against coherent attacks for CVs20,21 but only for an
unrealistically large number of distributed quantum states.
Here we report a continuous-variable QKD implementation
that generates a ﬁnite and composable key that is secure against
coherent attacks and whose security is furthermore 1sDI under
memoryless assumption. The security of our implemented
protocol is based on an extension of the security proof
in ref. 14 including measurement ﬂaws in the trusted
detector. Our implementation is based on Gaussian Einstein–
Podolsky–Rosen (EPR) entangled light and homodyne detection
as considered in the security proof. An optimized, highly efﬁcient
error reconciliation algorithm was developed to enable the
generation of the secret key.
Results
Robustness against implementation side channels. The 1sDI
QKD implementation presented here is very robust against
implementation side-channel attacks. It is secure against mem-
oryfree attacks performed on Bob’s untrusted detector, that is,
attacks that are independent on Bob’s previous measurement
outcomes. This includes recently proposed attacks on the inten-
sity of the local oscillator22,23, calibration attacks of the shot-noise
reference24,25, wavelength attacks on the homodyne beam
splitter26,27 and saturation attacks on the homodyne detector’s
electronic circuit28. Furthermore it is secure against Trojan-horse
attacks on the source that usually threaten electro-optical
modulators commonly used in Gaussian-modulation QKD
protocols29,30. Placing the EPR source at Alice’s station and
assuming that her station is private and inaccessible to the
eavesdropper by other means than the quantum channel6,
prevents exploiting side channels related to the local oscillator
used by Alice’s trusted detector as the eavesdropper simply has no
way of accessing it. Saturation attacks on Alice’s homodyne
detector are directly prevented by the security proof that includes
an upper and lower bound for measurement outcomes14,28.
EPR source. Our implemented protocol uses two continuous-
wave optical light ﬁelds whose amplitude and phase quadrature
amplitude modulations were mutually entangled31, produced by a
source which is the only component in the set-up that is not
compatible with existing telecommunication components. Using
EPR entanglement as a resource makes our protocol a CV
equivalent of the BBM92 protocol for discrete variables32. The
schematic of the experimental set-up is illustrated in Fig. 1a. Two
squeezed-light sources33,34, each composed of a nonlinear PPKTP
crystal and a coupling mirror, were pumped with a bright pump
ﬁeld at 775 nm (yellow) to produce two squeezed vacuum states at
the telecommunication wavelength of 1,550 nm (red). The two
squeezed vacua, both exhibiting a high squeezing of more than
10 dB, were superimposed at a balanced beam splitter with a
relative phase of p/2, thus generating EPR entanglement31. One of
the output modes of the beam splitter was kept by Alice, while the
other was sent to Bob. The technical details of the source,
including the locking scheme, were characterized in ref. 35.
Figure 1b–e shows the distribution of measurement outcomes
obtained by the two parties measuring either the amplitude (X) or
phase (P) quadrature of their respective light ﬁeld with balanced
homodyne detection. Each measurement outcome is truly
random since it stems from parametrically ampliﬁed zero-point
ﬂuctuations. When both parties simultaneously measure either X
or P the strong correlations between their outcomes are clearly
visible (Fig. 1b,e). If the two parties measure different quadratures
instead, the measurement outcomes are uncorrelated (Fig. 1c,d).
The strength of the correlations of Alice’s and Bob’s measurement
for the same quadratures, which is related to the initial squeezing
strength, is a central parameter in our QKD protocol and enters
the key length computation directly in the form of an average
distance dpe, introduced below.
A schematic of the experimental QKD set-up is shown in
Fig. 2. The entanglement source was located at Alice’s station and
the local oscillators used for homodyne detection of the two
entangled modes were generated locally at her station as well.
While this assured that Alice’s local oscillator was inaccessible to
an eavesdropper, Bob’s local oscillator was sent from Alice to Bob
via a free-space channel. Both local oscillators had a power of
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10mW each. Implementation details can be found in the
Methods section.
Precise steps of the QKD protocol. Preliminaries. Alice and Bob
use a pre-shared key to authenticate the classical communication
channel for post-processing36. Furthermore, Alice and Bob
negotiate all parameters needed during the protocol run and
Alice performs a shot-noise calibration measurement by blocking
the signal beam input of her homodyne detector.
Measurement phase. Alice prepares an entangled state using her
EPR source and sends one of the output modes to Bob along with
a local oscillator beam. Both Alice and Bob choose, randomly and
independently from each other, a quadrature X or P, which they
simultaneously measure by homodyne detection of their light
ﬁelds. The outcome of this measurement is called a sample. This
step is repeated until 2N samples have been obtained.
Sifting. Alice and Bob announce their measurement bases and
discard all samples measured in different quadratures.
Discretization. The continuous spectrum of the measurement
outcomes is discretized by the analogue-to-digital converter used
to record the measurement. During the discretization step, Alice
and Bob map the ﬁne grained discretization of their remaining
samples caused by the analogue-to-digital converter to a coarser
one consisting of 2d consecutive bins. In the interval [ a, a] a
binning with equal length is used, which is complemented by two
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Figure 1 | EPR entanglement source for CV QKD. (a) The source consists of two continuous-wave squeezed vacuum beams, generated by type I
parametric down conversion at 1,550 nm (red), which are superimposed at a balanced beam splitter with a relative phase of p=2. Yellow beam: 775 nm
pump ﬁeld, DBS: dichroic beam splitter, PS: phase shifter. (b–e) Correlations between Alice’s and Bob’s data, measured by balanced homodyne detection in
either the amplitude (X) or phase (P) quadrature. The data is normalized to the noise s.d. of a vacuum state. Blue: EPR entangled state used for QKD. Black:
Reference measurement of zero-point ﬂuctuations of the ground state (vacuum).
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Figure 2 | Implementation of Alice’s and Bob’s QKD receivers. Both parties used balanced homodyne detection (BHD) to measure their part of the
quadrature entangled state. The measured quadrature angle was controlled by a computer via a fast ﬁbre-coupled electro-optical modulator (EOM). To
make sure that Alice and Bob switched between the same orthogonal quadratures, a phase shifter (PS) was employed to compensate slow phase drifts (see
Methods section). Optical losses of the transmission channel to Bob were modelled by a variable attenuator consisting of a half-wave plate (l/2) and a
polarizing beam splitter (PBS). The measurement rate was 100 kHz. PD, photo diode.
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bins (N,  a) and (a,N). The parameter a is used to include
the ﬁnite range of the homodyne detectors into the security proof.
Channel parameter estimation. The secret key length is
calculated using the average distance between Alice’s and Bob’s
samples. To estimate it, the two parties randomly choose a
common subset of length k from the sifted and discretized data,
XpeA and X
pe
B , respectively, which they communicate over the
public classical channel. Using these, they calculate
dpe X
pe
A ;X
pe
B
  ¼ 1
k
Xk
m¼1
XpeA
 
m X
pe
B
 
m
 ; ð1Þ
and abort if it exceeds a threshold agreed on in the preliminaries
step.
Error reconciliation. Bob corrects the errors in his data to
match Alice’s using the hybrid error reconciliation algorithm
described below. Later, Alice and Bob conﬁrm that the
reconciliation was successful.
Calculation of secret key length. Using the results from the
channel parameter estimation and considering the number of
published bits during error reconciliation, Alice and Bob calculate
the secret key length ‘ according to the presented secret key
length formula in the Methods section. If the secret key length is
negative, they abort the protocol.
Privacy ampliﬁcation. Alice and Bob apply a hash function that
is randomly chosen from a two universal family37, to their
corrected strings to produce the secret key of length ‘.
Assumptions of the security proof. The assumptions of the
security proof on our implementation are the following: (1) Alice’s
station is a private space6 and Bob’s station is isolated, that is,
neither Bob’s measurement choice nor his measurement results are
leaking his station. (2) The energy of Alice’s mode of the EPR state
is bounded which allows Alice to determine the probability for
measuring a quadrature amplitude value exceeding the parameter
a. (3) Alice switches her homodyne detector randomly between
two orthogonal quadratures (X and P) with 50% probability.
(4) Bob is choosing randomly between two measurements that
are assumed to be memoryless. (5) The phase noise present in
Alice’s measurement is Gaussian distributed with variances VX
and VP for the amplitude and phase quadrature, respectively.
The ﬁrst assumption is natural to (almost) all QKD
implementations. The second one is assured in our implementa-
tion by placing the EPR source into Alice’s station. For the third
and fourth assumptions two independent quantum random
number generators located at Alice’s and Bob’s stations were
employed. For implementation details we refer to the Methods
section. While Bob is choosing randomly between two measure-
ments, it is not required that they are orthogonal quadrature
measurements. Since the security of the key is independent of the
actual measurements, an eavesdropper may temper with the local
oscillator sent to Bob. In an experimental implementation phase
noise is unavoidable, hence the security proof of ref. 14 has been
extended, see Methods section for details. We characterized the
phase noise in our implementation before the run of the protocol,
showed that the quadratures are indeed Gaussian distributed and
determined the variances to VX¼VPE(0.46±0.01)2. Details
are given in the Methods section. Thus, our implementation
fulﬁlls all requirements of the security proof and the key
generated by the above protocol is e-secure against coherent
attacks, where e is the so-called composable security parameter.
Error reconciliation protocol. Important for a high key rate is an
error reconciliation protocol, which has an efﬁciency close to the
Shannon limit. Since in our CV QKD protocol the discretized
sample values are non-binary and follow a Gaussian distribution,
error reconciliation codes with high efﬁciency and low error rate
are more difﬁcult to achieve than for discrete-variable protocols
with uniformly distributed binary outcomes17. To solve the
problem, we designed a two-phase error reconciliation protocol
that can exploit the non-uniform distribution efﬁciently. First the
d1 least signiﬁcant bits of each sample are sent to Bob. Since these
bits are only very weakly correlated, this step works with an
efﬁciency very close to the Shannon limit. In a second step Alice
and Bob use a non-binary low density parity check (LDPC) code
over the Galois ﬁeld GF 2d2
 
to correct the d2¼ d d1 most
signiﬁcant bits. d1, d2, as well as the LDPC code were optimized
for the different channel conditions and the actually employed
code was determined using the k revealed samples from the
channel parameter estimation. More details are given in the
Methods section.
Secret key generation. Figure 3 shows the experimental results.
First we removed the variable attenuator in the transmission line
to Bob and executed the protocol for different sample sizes to
show the effect of the ﬁnite sample size on the secure key rate
(Fig. 3a, blue points). For each sample size the number of samples
k used for channel parameter estimation was optimized before
each run of the QKD protocol to yield maximum key length. The
hybrid error reconciliation had a total efﬁciency of b¼ 94.6%
without a single frame error. While we achieved a positive secret
key rate with already 5 106 samples, the secret key rate of 0.485
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Figure 3 | Secure key rates achieved by our CV QKD system. Common
parameters: a¼ 61.6, d¼ 12, e¼ 2 10 10. (a) Effect of the ﬁnite number
of distributed quantum states on the secret key rate. The graph shows
experimental results (blue points) obtained without the variable attenuator
in Bob’s arm. The theoretical model (solid line) is included for comparison
and was calculated by reconstructing the covariance matrix for 108
samples. (b) Experimentally obtained secure key rate versus optical
attenuation in the transmission line to Bob’s detector for 2 108 measured
samples (blue points). The error bars (s.d.) are owing to the accuracy of the
measurement of the optical attenuation. The theoretical model (solid line)
was calculated by reconstructing the covariance matrix of the state
corresponding to no attenuation (0 dB) and using a reconciliation efﬁciency
of b¼94.3%.
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bit per sample achieved for 2 108 samples is close to saturation.
The theoretical model, which is the solid line in the ﬁgure, is
shown for comparison.
With the variable attenuator in place, we varied the optical loss
of the channel to Bob between 0 and 16% (Fig. 3b), which is
equivalent to a ﬁbre length of up to 2.7 km when standard
telecommunication ﬁbres with an attenuation of 0.2 dB km 1 are
used and a coupling efﬁciency of 95% is taken into account. By
measuring a total of 2 108 samples we were still able to achieve
a secret key rate of about 0.1 bit per sample at an equivalent ﬁbre
length of 2.7 km (E0.76 dB channel loss). This value, as well as
the secret key sizes at the other attenuation values, were achieved
by having a very high overall error reconciliation efﬁciency
between b¼ 94.3 and 95.5%, again without a single frame error.
The theoretical model shown in the ﬁgure reveals that even an
optical transmission loss of almost 1.2 dB between Alice and
Bob should be possible. This corresponds to an equivalent
distance of about 4.8 km, which is already enough to implement
CV QKD links with composable 1sDI security against coherent
attacks between parties in, for instance, a city’s central business
district.
Discussion
In conclusion, we have successfully implemented continuous-
variable QKD with composable and 1sDI security against
coherent attacks. Along with the exploitation of strong EPR
entanglement and a new highly efﬁcient error reconciliation
algorithm, the innovation of fast controlled random switching
between the two measured quadrature angles with low phase
noise made the implementation possible. While in our set-up
Alice and Bob were located on the same optical table, they could
in principle be separated and connected by a standard
telecommunication ﬁbre (see Methods section).
Estimations show that our implementation is limited to about
4.8 km. Longer distances will be possible by using optical ﬁbres
with less loss, or by using reverse reconciliation where about
16 km are possible with a similar set-up38. Remaining secure
against coherent attacks in the ﬁnite-size regime over even larger
distances requires new security proofs since the uncertainty
principle employed here yields a secret key rate that does not
converge with number of distributed quantum states to the rate
achieved for collective attacks and other currently available proofs
require an unfeasibly large number of distributed quantum states.
Even more impact will have a further developed proof that keeps
all features demonstrated here, but avoids the requirement
for an EPR source. It might be based on Gaussian modulation
of coherent states39 instead, thus, making 1sDI QKD
implemenations with composable security against the most
general attacks possible that are solely based on telecommu-
nication components.
Methods
Details of the experimental set-up. The measurement rate of our implementa-
tion was 100 kHz. For each measurement, both Alice and Bob had to choose
randomly between the X and P quadrature. The necessary relative phase shifts
of p/2 of the local oscillator with respect to the signal beam were applied to the
local oscillator beam by a high-bandwidth ﬁbre-coupled electro-optical phase
modulator driven by a digital pattern generator PCI-Express card. Since not only
the orthogonality of the measurements is important but also that Alice and Bob
measure the same set of quadratures, we compensated slow phase drifts by a phase
shifter made of a piezo attached mirror. The error signal for this locking loop was
derived by employing an 82MHz single sideband from the entanglement genera-
tion35 that was detected by the homodyne detector. By lowpass ﬁltering the
demodulated homodyne signal at 10 kHz with a sufﬁciently high order, the high
frequency phase changes from the ﬁbre-coupled phase modulator were averaged
over. To make the average independent of the chosen sequence of quadratures we
used the following scheme. For a choice of the X quadrature, the phase modulator
was ﬁrst set to a phase of p/2 during the ﬁrst half of the 10ms interval, and then to
0. For the P quadrature, the phase was ﬁrst set to 0 and then to p/2. Thus, this
scheme made sure that the phase did not stay in one quadrature for longer than
10 ms even in the case where one party chose by chance to measure only one
quadrature for a while. The measurement was performed synchronously by Alice
and Bob in the second half of the interval after 3 ms settling time.
The data acquisition was triggered by the pattern generator and performed by a
two channel PCI-Express card at a rate of 256MHz. The 200 acquired samples per
channel were digitally mixed down at 8MHz, lowpass ﬁltered by a 200-tap ﬁnite
impulse-response ﬁlter with a cutoff frequency of 200 kHz and downsampled to
one sample. After the total number of samples were recorded the classical post-
processing of the QKD protocol was performed.
Alice and Bob both employed a local oscillator with a power of 10mW, yielding
a dark noise clearance of about 18 dB. The efﬁciency of both homodyne detectors
was 98% (quantum efﬁciency of the photo diodes 99%, homodyne visibility 99.5%).
The pump powers for the two squeezed-light sources were 140 and 170mW,
respectively.
The optical attenuation of the variable attenuator used in Fig. 3b was measured
by determining the strength of the 35.5MHz phase modulation used to lock one of
the squeezed-light sources35 with Bob’s homodyne detector. The error bars in the
ﬁgure are due to the accuracy of this measurement.
While in our implementation both parties were located on the same optical
table and the quantum states including the local oscillator for Bob’s homodyne
detection were transmitted through free space, a separation is in principle possible
by using standard telecommunication ﬁbres. To send both the entangled state and
the local oscillator to Bob, they could be, for instance, time multiplexed. Using a
dedicated ﬁbre for both beams would also be possible. To achieve synchronization
between the two parties, a modulated 1,310 nm beam could be employed that could
be sent along with the local oscillator by wavelength division multiplexing.
Determination of Alice’s homodyne measurement phase noise. The mea-
surement of the phase noise of Alice’s homodyne detection during random
switching between the X and P quadrature was performed by measuring the beat
between the local oscillator and the bright control beam that was used to lock the
squeezed-light sources. Scanning the local oscillator’s phase yielded a calibration
between the measured output voltage of the homodyne detector’s circuit and the
phase angle between local oscillator and signal ﬁeld. Measurements were taken with
an oscilloscope while randomly switching the quadrature. As for the quadrature
measurements (see above) a segment of 1 ms was taken 3 ms after switching
quadratures and the mean value was calculated. Since the local oscillator was
switched randomly between the X and P quadrature the phase noise is symmetric
between the quadratures, hence VX¼VP. Figure 4 shows a histogram of the phase
noise measurement for 105 samples. The red solid line shows a ﬁt of a Gaussian
distribution. The s.d. of the phase noise was determined to (0.46±0.01), which is
quite low despite the randomly switched quadrature angle34. Thereby the error was
determined by bootstrapping 1,000 data points from a total of 10,000.
Quantum random number generator. The security of the protocol relies on the
use of true random numbers that are needed by Alice and Bob to choose between
the X and P quadrature, and to determine a random hash function during privacy
ampliﬁcation. We implemented a quantum random number generator following a
scheme from ref. 40, which is based on vacuum state measurements performed by a
balanced homodyne detector. For this purpose we implemented another balanced
homodyne detector with blocked signal port using an independent 6mW 1,550 nm
beam from a ﬁbre laser as local oscillator. The output of the homodyne detector
circuit was anti-alias ﬁltered by a 50MHz fourth-order Butterworth ﬁlter and
sampled with a sampling frequency of 256MHz by a data acquisition card. The
data was subsequently mixed down digitally at 8MHz, lowpass ﬁltered with a
200-tap ﬁnite-impulse-response ﬁlter with a cutoff frequency of 5MHz and
downsampled to 2MHz. The generation of the random numbers from the data
stream followed the procedure in ref. 40.
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Figure 4 | Phase noise measurement result. The s.d. of the ﬁtted Gaussian
function (red solid line) is 0.46±0.01.
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Security proof considering measurement ﬂaws. We use the security proof from
ref. 14 and generalize it to phase errors in Alice’s measurement of X and P. It has
been shown that if the protocol passes, a secure key of length14
‘  n log 1
c dð Þ  log g d
0
pe
  
 ‘LK O log 1e
 
; ð2Þ
can be extracted. Here, n¼N k is the number of samples used for the key
generation, g is a bound on the correlation between Alice and Bob depending on
the previously agreed average distance threshold d0pe and ‘LK is the number of
communicated bits in the error correction protocol. The only term depending on
Alice’s measurement device is c(d), which refers to the overlap of the discretized X
and P measurements performed by Alice. In case of ideal X and P measurements
satisfying the commutation relation [X, P]¼ i‘ one obtains c(d)rd2/(2p‘), where
equality holds approximately for relevant sizes of d.
Let us now assume that owing to experimental imperfections the actual
measurements X and P deviate by a phase yX and yP from the ideal measurements,
where yX and yP are distributed according to a Gaussian distribution with variance
VX and VP centred at 0. Then we ﬁnd that X and P satisfy the canonical
commutation relation [X, P]¼ i‘0 with ‘0 ¼ ‘cosy, y¼ yXþ yP. This then results in
an overlap c(d, y)¼ d2/(2p‘0)¼ c(d)/cosy.
Considering n independent measurements, we obtain
log
Y
i
cosyi
c dð Þ ¼ n log1=c dð Þþ
X
i
log cos yið Þ: ð3Þ
Using that log cos(y)Z y2/(2 ln2), we can boundPi log cos yið Þ   1= 2 ln2ð ÞPi y2i
and Hoeffding’s inequality yields that
P
i y
2
i  n VX þVP þ ePð Þ with probability
exponentially small in e2Pn. Here we assumed that yX and yP are independent so
that the expectation of y2 is VXþVP. Plugging this into (2), we ﬁnd that for
Gaussian phase noise with variances VX and VP a secure key of length
‘  n log 1
c dð Þ 
VX þVP
2 ln2
 logg d0pe
  
 ‘LK O log 1e
 
ð4Þ
can be generated.
Classical post-processing. The main post-processing is performed with the AIT
QKD software. For the current protocol the following algorithms are combined:
(i) the binning of the synchronized outcomes, (ii) the estimation algorithm for CV
QKD, (iii) the reconciliation algorithm for CV QKD, (iv) the conﬁrmation algo-
rithm and (v) the privacy ampliﬁcation algorithm. All classical messages during the
protocol are authenticated with a message authentication code using a pre-shared
secret key to select a random function from a set of (almost strongly two universal)
polynomial hash functions.
(i) First, Bob’s samples in the P quadrature are multiplied by  1 to account for
the anti-correlation. Alice and Bob then discretize their sifted samples into 2d 2
bins of equal size d in the interval [ a, a], and two additional bins (N,  a)
and (a,N). The 2d bins are identiﬁed with the key generation alphabet
wkg¼ {0, 1}d and each bin (symbol) has a unique binary representation of d bits.
Alice and Bob obtain the binned sifted samples XsiftA 2 wNkg and XsiftB 2 wNkg,
respectively. Throughout the experiment we have used a key generation alphabet
of size jwkgj ¼ 212.
(ii) In the estimation module for CV QKD the average distance between
Alice’s and Bob’s binned symbols is estimated. Alice chooses a random index set
EC {1, 2,y, N} of size Ej j ¼ k for estimation and communicates E together with
the corresponding binned symbols XpeA :¼ XsiftA Eð Þ to Bob. Bob determines his
corresponding binned raw key symbols XpeB :¼ XsiftB Eð Þ, calculates the mean
difference dpe between X
pe
A and X
pe
B (see equation (1)), and checks that dpe  d0pe.
Here, d0pe has been determined before the run of the protocol by a theoretical
estimation given the characterization of the source, the ﬁbre loss and excess noise.
If the test passes they continue with the protocol and both parties remove
the k estimation samples from their sifted samples to form their raw keys
XA :¼ XsiftA nXpeA 2 wN  kkg and XB :¼ XsiftB nXpeB 2 wN  kkg .
(iii) The reconciliation module for CV QKD implements the hybrid
reconciliation protocol. As the security analysis uses direct reconciliation, Bob has
to correct his raw key XB to match with Alice’s XA to generate a common raw key
X. The hybrid reconciliation used to correct Bob’s noisy raw key operates directly
on the key generation alphabet wkg. In preparation for the hybrid reconciliation,
two additional alphabets w^ and w are introduced such that wkg ¼ w^w. Hence,
each symbol xAwkg has a unique decomposition x ¼ ðx^; xÞ with x^ 2 w^ and
x 2 w. We take for x^ the d2 most signiﬁcant bits of the binary representation of x,
and for x the remaining d1¼ d d2 least signiﬁcant bits of the binary
representation of x. We thus decompose the raw keys as X ¼ ðX^; XÞ, where X^ and
X denote the sequence of the d2 most and the d1 least signiﬁcant bits of each key
symbol, respectively. The reconciliation module performs the following steps:
(iiia) On the basis of the variance of her binned raw key and the samples XpeA
and XpeB , Alice determines d1, d2, and the code rate R such that the expected leakage
is minimized with respect to the entropy in Bob’s symbols, and transmits these
parameters to Bob.
(iiib) Then Alice communicates XA to Bob who reconciles XB simply by setting
XB :¼ XA. Hence, the errors that are left in Bob’s key XB are reduced to the errors
in X^B. Non-binary LDPC reconciliation is used to correct X^B as described in the
next step.
(iiic) Both Alice and Bob split their X^A and X^B into blocks X^
ð‘Þ
A and X^
ð‘Þ
B ,
‘ ¼ 1; . . . ; N  kn0 , each with n0 ¼ 105 elements of w^. For this step we identify w^ with
GF 2d2
 
, the Galois ﬁeld with 2d2 elements. For each block X^ð‘ÞA , Alice uses the
parity check matrix H˜ of an LDPC code over GF 2d2
 
and rate R to calculate the
syndrome sð‘Þ :¼ ~H  X^ð‘ÞA . Alice sends the syndrome sð‘Þ to Bob. For all elements
j 2 GF 2d2  and for all indices iA{1,y,n} in the block Bob calculates the
conditional probability that ðX^ ‘ð ÞA Þi ¼ j, given that Bob has obtained ðX^ ‘ð ÞB Þi and
given Alice’s value ðXð‘ÞA Þi . Bob uses these probabilities to initialize a non-binary
belief propagation decoder.
The non-binary belief propagation decoder operates in the probability domain
using the multi-dimensional Hadamard transform to speed up the check node
operations41. Using the syndrome sð‘Þ and the conditional probabilities mentioned
above, this decoder calculates Bob’s estimate ~Xð‘ÞA of Alice’s block X
ð‘Þ
A .
We have constructed parity check matrices of non-binary LDPC codes over
Galois ﬁelds of order 32, 64, 128 and 256 with code rates RA{0.50, 0.51,y, 0.95}.
Each LDPC code has a variable-node degree of two, is check concentrated, and has
a block length of 105 symbols. We used the progressive edge-growth algorithm42 to
construct binary codes in a ﬁrst step. Then each edge has been assigned a random
non-zero element of the corresponding Galois ﬁeld42. Alice and Bob have access to
all non-binary parity check matrices.
In our proof-of-principle experiment the error reconciliation step took about
2 h on a single central processing unit (CPU) core for the largest data set of 2 108
samples. Taking into account the about 30min to measure the data, real-time error
reconciliation could in principle be achieved by splitting the task to, for example,
ﬁve CPU cores. Alternatively, to speed up the computation an LDPC decoder
algorithm with reduced complexity could be employed43.
(iv) After each block has been corrected, a conﬁrmation step establishes the
correctness of the protocol using a family H of (almost) two universal hash
functions with Probh2rH h x1ð Þ ¼ h x2ð Þð Þ  ec for all x1ax2. For each block Alice
chooses a hash function h randomly from H and communicates her choice to Bob.
Alice and Bob apply this hash function to their blocks Xð‘ÞA and ~X
ð‘Þ
A and exchange
the results. If their results agree the probability that Alice’s and Bob’s blocks are
different is bounded from above by ec. If their results disagree then their blocks are
deﬁnitely different, and they discard them.
(v) Finally, Alice and Bob feed the sequence of all conﬁrmed blocks into the
privacy ampliﬁcation module. Given the accumulated leakage ‘LK in bits from the
previous protocol steps, the secure key length ‘ is calculated according to
equation (4). Alice chooses a hash function randomly from a two universal
hash family and communicates her choice to Bob. Then Alice and Bob
both apply this hash function to the reconciled blocks and obtain the e-secure
key Ksec.
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